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Abstract
We propose an incentive scheme based on intervention to sustain cooperation among self-
interested users. In the proposed scheme, an intervention device collects imperfect signals about
the actions of the users for a test period, and then chooses the level of intervention that degrades
the performance of the network for the remaining time period. We analyze the problems of
designing an optimal intervention rule given a test period and choosing an optimal length of
the test period. The intervention device can provide the incentive for cooperation by exerting
intervention following signals that involve a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length
of the test period has two counteracting effects on the performance: It improves the quality of
signals, but at the same time it weakens the incentive for cooperation due to increased delay.
1 Introduction
This paper studies incentive schemes to sustain cooperation among self-interested users sharing
a common network resource. When users utilize the network resource considering their own self-
interest, a problem known as the tragedy of the commons [1] is likely to occur, yielding a suboptimal
performance. Different methods to overcome the problem have been investigated in the literature.
One method widely studied in economics and engineering is pricing [2]. Pricing can induce efficient
use of network resources by internalizing negative externalities. Although pricing has a solid theo-
retical foundation, implementing a pricing scheme can be impractical or cumbersome in some cases.
Let us consider a wireless Internet service as an example. A service provider can limit access to
its network resources by charging an access fee. However, charging an access fee requires a secure
and reliable method to process payments, which creates burden on both sides of users and service
providers. There also arises the issue of allocative fairness when a service provider charges for the
Internet service. In the presence of the income effect, pricing will bias the allocation of network
resources towards users with high incomes. Because the Internet can play the role of an informa-
tion equalizer, it has been argued in a public policy debate that access to the Internet should be
provided as a public good by a public authority rather than as a private good in a market [3].
Another method popular in game theory is to use repeated interaction [4]. Repeated interaction
can encourage cooperative behavior by adjusting future payoffs depending on current behavior. A
repeated game strategy can form a basis of an incentive scheme in which monitoring and punishment
burden is decentralized to users (see, for example, [5]). However, implementing a repeated game
strategy requires repeated interaction among users, which may not be available. For example, users
interacting in a mobile network change frequently in nature.
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In this paper, we use an alternative method based on intervention, which was proposed in our
previous work [6]. In an incentive scheme based on intervention, a network is augmented with
an intervention device that is able to monitor the actions of users and to take an action that
affects the payoffs of users. In [6], we considered an ideal scenario where the intervention device
can observe the actions of users without errors immediately after users choose their actions. In
this paper, we consider a more realistic scenario where the intervention device can obtain only
imperfect information about the actions of users and it takes time for the intervention device
to collect signals. Intervention directly affects the network usage of users, unlike pricing which
uses an outside instrument to affect the payoffs of users. Thus, an incentive scheme based on
intervention can provide an effective and robust method to induce cooperation in that users cannot
avoid intervention as long as they use network resources. Moreover, it does not require long-term
relationship among users, which makes it applicable to networks with a dynamically changing user
population.
2 Model and Problem Formulation
We consider a communication channel shared by N users. Time is divided into slots of equal length,
and in each slot a user can attempt to transmit its packet or wait. If there is only one transmission
attempt in a slot, the packet is successfully transmitted. If there is more than one transmission
attempt in a slot, packets collide and no transmission is successful. For simplicity, we assume that
each user can choose one of two transmission probabilities pl and ph, where pl = 1/N < ph < 1.
Note that each user choosing pl maximizes the total throughput, defined as the average number
of successfully transmitted packets per time slot, assuming that all the users choose the same
transmission probability [7].
We consider a period consisting of T consecutive time slots, and analyze interaction in the period
without any consideration of past or future periods. We assume that the number of users and their
transmission probabilities are fixed throughout a period. LetN = {1, . . . , N} be the set of the users.
The action space of user i is denoted by Ai = {pl, ph}, and the action of user i is denoted by ai ∈ Ai,
for all i ∈ N . An action profile is represented by a vector a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ A ,
∏
i∈N Ai. The
payoff of user i is given by the number of its successfully transmitted packets per time slot. Then the
expected payoff of user i is given by the probability of its successful transmission, ai
∏
j∈N\{i}(1−aj).
It is easy to see that the action ph is a dominant strategy for every user. Hence, (ph, . . . , ph) is
the unique Nash equilibrium, which yields the lower total throughput than the symmetric social
optimum (pl, . . . , pl).
In order to improve the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium, we introduce an intervention device in
the system. The intervention device is capable of monitoring the actions of the users and interfering
in the transmission of the users. The intervention device can sense the channel to learn whether the
channel is idle (i.e., no user attempts to transmit its packet) or busy (i.e., at least one user attempts
to transmit its packet). We consider a scenario where the intervention device collects signals from
sensing the channel for the first t slots, where 1 ≤ t ≤ T , and then chooses its transmission
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probability, which can be interpreted as the intervention level.
Let S = {idle, busy} be the set of all possible signals obtained in a slot. Then the set of
all possible signals that the intervention device can obtain for the t slots is St. The probability
distribution of signals is independent across slots, and when the users choose action profile a, the
probability of obtaining an idle signal in a slot is given by q(a) ,
∏
i∈N (1 − ai). After obtaining
t signals, the intervention device chooses a transmission probability in [0, 1], which remains fixed
until the end of the period. We use subscript 0 for the intervention device. The action space
of the intervention device is denoted by A0 = [0, 1], and its action is denoted by a0 ∈ A0. The
decision rule of the intervention device, called the intervention rule, can be represented by a function
f : St → A0. Since the transmission probabilities of the users do not change in a period, there is
no gain for the intervention device to distinguish signals from different slots. Hence, we focus on
the class of intervention rules that use only the number of idle signals, which can be represented
by f : {0, 1, . . . , t} → A0. The probability that k idle signals arise out of t signals when the users
choose action profile a is
(
t
k
)
q(a)k(1−q(a))t−k, for k = 0, 1, . . . , t. Note that monitoring is imperfect
in the sense that the intervention device cannot observe the action profile of the users but obtains
only imperfect information about the action profile.
The sequence of events in a period can be listed as follows.
1. At the beginning of the period, the users choose their transmission probabilities a ∈ A, which
are used from slot 1 to slot T , knowing the intervention rule f adopted by the intervention
device.
2. The intervention device collects signals from slot 1 to slot t.
3. The intervention device intervenes using the transmission probability prescribed by the inter-
vention rule f from slot t+ 1 to slot T .
The payoff of user i when the users choose action profile a and the intervention device chooses
action a0 is given by
ui(a0,a) =
t
T
ai
∏
j∈N\{i}
(1− aj) +
T − t
T
ai(1− a0)
∏
j∈N\{i}
(1− aj) (1)
=
(
1−
T − t
T
a0
)
ai
∏
j∈N\{i}
(1− aj). (2)
The action profile of the users influences the probability distribution of signals, which in turn affects
the action of the intervention device. The expected payoff of user i when the users choose action
profile a and the intervention device uses intervention rule f can be expressed as
vi(a; f) =
t∑
k=0
(
t
k
)
q(a)k(1− q(a))t−kui(f(k),a) (3)
=
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
(
t
k
)
q(a)k(1− q(a))t−kf(k)
]
ai
∏
j∈N\{i}
(1− aj). (4)
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Note that
∑t
k=0
(
t
k
)
q(a)k(1− q(a))t−kf(k) can be interpreted as the expected transmission proba-
bility of the intervention device, while (T − t)/T is the weight on the slots in which the action of
the intervention device affects the users.
For notation, let us define
λ(k; t) =
(
t
k
)
[(1− pl)
N ]k[1− (1− pl)
N ]t−k, (5)
µ(k; t) =
(
t
k
)
[(1− pl)
N−1(1− ph)]
k[1− (1− pl)
N−1(1− ph)]
t−k, (6)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , t, and let τc = pl(1 − pl)
N−1 and τd = ph(1 − pl)
N−1. λ(k; t) is the probability of
k idle signals arising out of t signals when every user cooperates (i.e., chooses pl), while µ(k; t) is
that when exactly one user defects (i.e., chooses ph). τc is the cooperation throughput that each
user obtains when all the users choose pl, while τd is the defection throughput that a user obtains
when it deviates to ph unilaterally. Note that an idle signal is more likely to occur when every user
cooperates than when some user defects. Also, note that τd > τc, which reflects the positive gain
from defection when there is no intervention.
Suppose that there is a network manager who determines the intervention rule used by the
intervention device. The objective of the manager is to maximize the sum of the payoffs (i.e., total
throughput) while sustaining cooperation among the users. The cooperation payoff is given by
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
λ(k; t)f(k)
]
τc, (7)
while the defection payoff is
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
µ(k; t)f(k)
]
τd. (8)
Hence, the incentive constraint for the users to cooperate can be written as
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
λ(k; t)f(k)
]
τc ≥
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
µ(k; t)f(k)
]
τd, (9)
and the problem of designing an intervention rule can be expressed as
max
f
N
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
λ(k; t)f(k)
]
τc (10)
subject to
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
λ(k; t)f(k)
]
τc ≥
[
1−
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
µ(k; t)f(k)
]
τd, (11)
0 ≤ f(k) ≤ 1 for all k = 0, . . . , t. (12)
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3 Analysis of the Design Problem
The design problem (10)–(12) can be rewritten as a linear programming (LP) problem,
min
f
t∑
k=0
λ(k; t)f(k) (13)
subject to
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
[τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t)]f(k) ≥ τd − τc (14)
0 ≤ f(k) ≤ 1 for all k = 0, . . . , t. (15)
The LP problem (13)–(15) is to minimize the expected transmission probability of the intervention
device while satisfying the incentive constraint and the probability constraints. Exerting interven-
tion is necessary to punish a deviation, but at the same time intervention incurs efficiency loss under
imperfect monitoring. Therefore, the manager wants to use the minimum possible intervention level
while providing the incentive for cooperation. The left-hand side of the incentive constraint (14) is
the expected loss from deviation due to the change in the probability distribution of signals induced
by deviation, while the right-hand side is the gain from deviation.
Lemma 1. Suppose that an optimal solution to the LP problem (13)–(15) exists. Then the incentive
constraint (14) is satisfied with equality at the optimal solution.
Proof. Let f∗ be an optimal solution. Suppose that [(T − t)/T ]
∑t
k=0[τdµ(k; t) − τcλ(k; t)]f
∗(k) >
τd − τc. Since τd > τc, there exists k
′ such that τdµ(k
′; t) − τcλ(k
′; t) > 0 and f∗(k′) > 0. Then
we can reduce f∗(k′) while satisfying the incentive constraint and the probability constraint for k′,
which decreases the objective value since λ(k; t) > 0 for all k. This contradicts the optimality of
f∗.
Lemma 1 validates the intuition that the manager wants to use a punishment just enough to
prevent deviation. The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
LP problem to have a feasible solution, and the structure of an optimal solution.
Proposition 1. Let k0 = max{k : τdµ(k; t) − τcλ(k; t) > 0}. Then the LP problem has a feasible
solution if and only if
T − t
T
∑
k≤k0
[τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t)] ≥ τd − τc. (16)
Moreover, if the LP problem has a feasible solution, then there exists a unique optimal solution f∗
described by
f∗(k) =


1 if k < k¯,
1
τdµ(k¯;t)−τcλ(k¯;t)
[
T
T−t(τd − τc)−
∑k¯−1
k=0[τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t)]
]
if k = k¯,
0 if k > k¯,
(17)
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where
k¯ = min

k′ : T − tT
∑
k≤k′
[τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t)] ≥ τd − τc

 . (18)
Proof. Define the likelihood ratio of signal k (i.e., k idle signals out of t signals) by
L(k; t) =
µ(k; t)
λ(k; t)
=
(
1− ph
1− pl
)k (1− (1− pl)N−1(1− ph)
1− (1− pl)N
)t−k
. (19)
It is easy to see that L(0; t) > 1, L(t; t) < 1, and L(k; t) is monotonically decreasing in k. Note
that τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t) > 0 if and only if L(k; t) > pl/ph. Hence, k0 is well-defined, and τdµ(k; t)−
τcλ(k; t) > 0 if and only if k ≤ k0. If (16) is satisfied, then f˜ defined by f˜(k) = 1 for all k ≤ k0
and f˜(k) = 0 for all k > k0 is a feasible solution. To prove the converse, suppose that a feasible
solution, say f , exists. Then we have
T − t
T
∑
k≤k0
[τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t)] ≥
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
[τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t)]f(k) (20)
and
T − t
T
t∑
k=0
[τdµ(k; t)− τcλ(k; t)]f(k) ≥ τd − τc, (21)
and combining the two yields (16).
To prove the second result, suppose that the LP problem has a feasible solution. Then there
exists a feasible solution, say f , that satisfies the incentive constraint with equality. Define the
likelihood ratio of f by
l(f) =
∑
k µ(k; t)f(k)∑
k λ(k; t)f(k)
. (22)
Then the objective value in (13) at f can be expressed as
T
T − t
τd − τc
τdl(f)− τc
. (23)
Hence, the objective value decreases as f has a larger likelihood ratio. To optimize the objective
value, f should put the probabilities on the signals starting from signal 0 to signal 1, and so on,
until the incentive constraint is satisfied with equality. Thus, we obtain k¯, where 0 ≤ k¯ ≤ k0, that
is associated with the unique optimal solution.
Since a smaller number of idle signals gives a higher likelihood ratio, an intervention rule yields
a smaller efficiency loss when intervention is exerted following a smaller number of idle signals.
Put differently, signal k provides a stronger indication of defection as k is smaller. However, using
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only signal 0 may not be sufficient to provide the incentive for cooperation, in which case other
signals need to be used as well. Using signal k with k ≤ k0 contributes to provide the incentive for
cooperation, although the “quality” of the signal decreases as k increases. Hence, it is optimal for
the manager to use signals with small k primarily, which yields a threshold k¯.
So far we have analyzed the problem of designing an intervention rule when the total number
of signals, t, is fixed. Now we consider a scenario where the manager can choose t as well as an
intervention rule. In this scenario, there are two counteracting effects of increasing t. First, note
that the objective value in (10) can be expressed as
N
[
1−
τd − τc
τdl(f)− τc
]
τc, (24)
which shows that increasing t affects the objective value only through f . Since L(k; t) is increasing
in t, we can achieve a larger likelihood ratio l(f) with larger t. In other words, as the intervention
device collects more signals, the information becomes more accurate (quality effect). On the other
hand, increasing t decreases the weight given on the slots in which intervention is applied, which
makes the incentive constraint harder to satisfy (delay effect).
Let τ∗(t) be the optimal value of the design problem (10)–(12), where we set τ∗(t) = Nph(1 −
ph)
N−1 if there is no feasible solution with t. The problem of finding an optimal number of signals
can be written as maxt∈{1,...,T} τ
∗(t). In general, τ∗(t) is a non-monotonic function of t, and we
provide a numerical example to illustrate the result. We consider system parameters N = 5,
pl = 1/N = 0.2, ph = 0.8, and T = 100. Then we have τc = 0.08 and τd = 0.33. The numerical
results show that the LP problem is infeasible for t = 1 and t ≥ 21. With t = 1, there is not
sufficient information based on which intervention can provide the incentive for cooperation. With
t ≥ 21, the delay effect is dominant, which prevents the incentive constraint to be satisfied. Figure 1
plots τ∗(t) for t = 2, . . . , 20. We can see that τ∗(t) is non-monotonic while reaching the maximum
at t = 18 with τ∗(18) = 0.37. In the plot, the dotted line represents the total throughput at
(pl, . . . , pl), Nτc. The difference between τ
∗(t) and Nτc can be interpreted as the efficiency loss
due to imperfect monitoring.1 Lastly, we note that k¯ in Proposition 1 is non-decreasing in t, with
k¯ = 1 for t = 2, . . . , 7, k¯ = 2 for t = 8, . . . , 13, k¯ = 3 for t = 14, . . . , 18, and k¯ = 4 for t = 19, 20.
4 Conclusion
We have studied the problem of designing incentive schemes based on the idea of intervention to
sustain cooperation among users sharing network resources in the case of imperfect monitoring. We
have used a simple model to present the main ideas and results without too many complications.
Our model can be extended in several directions, among which we mention two. First, users can
use more complicated decision rules than the one choosing one of two transmission probabilities.
The action space for a user can be relaxed to [0, 1] instead of {pl, ph}. Also, users can have an
1If the intervention device can observe the actions of the users immediately, it can use the threat of transmitting
with probability 1 when a deviation is detected to sustain cooperation without incurring an efficiency loss.
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Figure 1: Plot of τ∗(t) for t = 2, . . . , 20.
ability to monitor the actions of other users and the intervention device. In such a scenario, we
can study intervention rules to sustain a cooperative decision rule, where a decision rule for a
user is a mapping from its information set to its action space. Second, the set of signals that the
intervention device can obtain in a slot can be generalized. For example, a signal can be ternary
(idle, success, collision) or the number of users that attempted to transmit. We can investigate how
optimal intervention rules and their performance change as the intervention device obtains finer
information about the actions of users. Finally, we conclude with a remark that incentive schemes
based on intervention can be applied to a wide range of networks where cooperative behavior should
be encouraged. Potential applications include communication networks (power control, congestion
control, and medium access control) and peer-to-peer networks.
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